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ALLUVIoN-ACQUISITION OF SUBMERGED LAND BY RELICWiddecombe v. Chiks, 73 S. W. 444

TION AND ACCESSION.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, March I8, E903). Where the Missouri River, after washing away a riparian lot belonging to
the United States, encroached upon the remoter lot of a private individual, and then changed its movement in the opposite direction, gradually restoring not only what it had taken
from the remoter lot, but also the entire government lot and
several hundred acres additional, the whole belonged to the
owner of the formerly remote, but now riparian lot, and a
patent for the government lot containing, in the words of the
patent, "eight acres and sixty-eight hundredths of an acre,"
given after the lot had been reclaimed from the river, passed
no title to the patentee. Both parties in this case were grantees of the United States.
The patentee's claim, as to part of the land in dispute,
rested on the ground that it occupied the space where the
federal lot had been before its inundation, and therefore be181
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longed to the government, and as to the remainder, that it
necessarily became the property of the 'United States as an
accretion to land already owned by it. The defendant contended that the whole was an accretion to his land and therefore belonged to him..
Whether land lost by erosion or submersion is regained to
the original owner of the fee when by reliction or accretion
the water recedes and the land emerges, is a question upon
which the few decisions are evenly divided. In the West the
question is one of practical interest to owners of land near
rapid-shifting streams like the Missouri or the Mississippi, and
in the East to hotel proprietors and land associations at seashore resorts.
All American cases opposing the Missouri rule are based on
an extract from Lord-Hale, "De Juri Maris," "If a subject
hath land adjoining the sea, and the violence of the sea swallow it up, but so that yet there be reasonable marks to continue the notice of it, or though the marks be defaced; yet if
by situation and extent of quantity, and boundary upon firm
land, the same can be known though the sea leave the land
again, or it bd by art or industry regained, the subject does
not lose his property, and accordingly it was held by Cooke v.
Fqrbes, M. 7 Jac. C. B., though the inundation continue for
forty years. . . . Bit if it be freely left again by the
reflex and recess of the sea, the owner may have his land again
as before, if he can make out where and what it was, for he
cannot lose his propriety of the soil, though it for a time
became part of the sea."
Mulrey v. Norton, ioo N. Y. 424 (I88 5 ), involved the title
to a portion of a sand bar opposite Far Rockaway Beach and
separated from the mainland by a narrow lagoon. The
owner of the nucleus of the bar claimed it as an accretion to
his land. The owner of the mainland claimed it as being
within the original boundaries of his tract which had been
partly submerged since his purchase. The court held that
even though the addition was formed against the nucleus of
Lhe bar its owner could not claim beyond the original boundaries of the mainland tract. The decision was based partly
upon an unreported Delaware case. The court remarks, "It
is not every disappearance of land by erosion or submergence that destroys the title of the true owner and enables
another to acquire it, for the erosion must be accompanied
by a transportation of the land to effect that result, or the
submergence followed by such a lapse of time as will preclude
the identity of the property from being established by its
reliction." Accord: Murphy v. Norton, 6i How. Pr. 197
(z88I).
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Gilbert v. Eldridge, 47 Minn. 210 (i8gi). The plaintiff purchased an inland lot and the defendant a shore block from the
owner of a lake tract, both conveyances being made with
reference to a map of the grantor platting his entire tract,
together with the shallows beyond the shore, into town blocks
and streets. The plaintiff's lot became riparian by the inundation of the defendant's square. The court refused to enjoin
the defendant from filling up the submerged lot and cutting
off the plaintiff from the lake, on the ground (i) that even if
the defendant had lost his title to the submerged lot, the state
and not the plaintiff had acquired it; (2) that the effect of
the conveyances with reference to the platting was to reserve
to the grantor the riparian right of reclamation, and riparian
rights not passing to the grantee of the original shore lot, the
gradual retirement of the shore line would not be incidentally
attended with the consequence of vesting such right in the
plaintiff. Gilbert v. Eldridge has been cited as being in opposition to the principle asserted in Widdecombe v. Chiles; the
case, however, seems to be authority only for its own facts,
and if in Minnesota, as in some states, the title of a riparian owner extended to the centre of navigable streams and
lakes, the decision might very possibly have been different.
Ocean City Association v. Shriver, 64 N. J. Law 550 (1900).
The plaintiff here owned shore land on which he platted a
street running parallel with the ocean several hundred feet
from the high-water line. He conveyed an inland lot to defendant's grantor, describing the block as fronting easterly
on this street, and making the sale with reference to the platting. When this land was conveyed to .the defendant by the
same description, the ocean extended over the street to the
granted lot. Afterwards the watcr receded. The land in
controversy was the result of this reliction. It was held by
a divided court (three judges dissenting) that the land belonged to the plaintiff. The fact that the call in the deed was
for a fixed monument was not regarded as decisive. The
decision was ultimately based squarely on these two pr5positions: (i) that as against any claim that might be made
under the title of plaintiff's grantee, the right of the plaintiff
must be determined as of the time when it conveyed the land
and not as of the time of the platting; and (2) that by the.
submergence of the land the owner did not entirely lose his
property in the soil.
The only case in the federal courts involving the principal
question here seems to be Stockley v. Cissna, i19 Fed. 812 (C.
C. A., Ninth Circuit), (i9o2), in which the facts and decision
are identical with lfulrey v. Norton, supra. St. Louis v. Rutz,
138 U. S. 247, was a case concerning avulsion, not accretion,
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but the court there cites Mulrey v. Norton with approval, saying, "It is well settled that the owner in fee of the bed of a
river, or other submerged land, is the owner of any bar, island,
or dry land which may be subsequently formed thereon."
The rule announced-by the Missouri court originated in a
dictum of a Connecticut case, Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292;
Io Atl. 565 (1889), where the court remarked, "If a particular
tract was entirely cut off from a river by an intervening tract,
and. that intervening tract should be gradually washed away
until the remoter tract became reached by the river, the latter'
tract would become riparian as much as if it had been originally uch. This follows necessarily from the ordinary applicationi of the principle. All original lines submerged by the
river have ceased to exist, the river is in itself a natural
boundary, and every changing condition of the river in relation to adjoining lands is treated as a natural relation and is
not affected in any manner by the relations of the river and
land in a .former period. If after washing away the intervening tract, it should encroach upon the remoter lot, and
should then begin to change its movement in the other direction, gradually restoringwhat had been taken from the remoter
lot and finally all that had been taken from the intervening lot,
the whole by the law of accretion would belong to the remoter,
but now proximate lot. Having become riparian it has all
riparian rights."
This dictum has been strictly followed in the Missouri decisions. The rule in that state, even if not correct, is clear and has
the advantage of being readily applied to any particular state
of facts. In accordance with the principal case are Naylor v.
Cox, 1i4 Mo. 232; Cox v. Arnold, 129 Mo. 337; Pricev. Hallett, 38 S. W. 451; Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 209; Rees v. McDaniel, ii 5 Mo. 145; Crandallv. Allen, i18 Mo. 403.
The Missouri rule is followed in.Wallace v. Driver, 6i Ark.
429 (1896) (one judge dissenting), and in Peuker v. Canter, 62
Kans. 363 (i9oi). In the latter case Ocean City Association
v. Shriver is noticed and heartily disapproved.
The correct solution of the principal question must be determined from the reason of the familiar rule that accretions
belong to the owner of the land against which they formed.
Blackstone attributes the rule to the principle "De mininis
non curat lox" and to the principle of natural justice that he
who sustains the burden of therlosses ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion. Most courts
regard. the latter reason as the true explanation of the rule.
Attorney-General v. Chambers, 4 DeG. & J. 55 (1859); Gifford v. Yarborough, 5 Bing. 163 (1828). Others attribute the
rule to the principle of public policy that it is to the interest
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of the community that all land shall have an owner, and most
convenient that gradual additions to the shore should follow
the title to the shore itself. Bank v. Ogden, 69 U. S. 67 (1864).
If the principle "De minimis non curat lex" is the true
explanation of the general rule, Widdecombe v. Chiles is a
correct decision. Its ruling is also proper if the reason of
the general doctrine regarding accretion is one of public
*policy and convenience. If the reason is one of equity and
compensation, Ocean City Association v. Shriver is probably
the more logical.
The question is one of so much doubt that it is by no means
certain how it would be decided in jurisdictions that have not
yet passed upon it.
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